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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
A jury convicted Timothy Lloyd on one count of computer 
sabotage, a violation of federal law. After one of the jurors 
advised the court that she had learned from the media 
during the course of deliberations about off-site computer 
sabotage, the District Court granted Lloyd's motion for a 
new trial. The government appeals. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Omega Engineering Corp. ("Omega") is a New Jersey- 
based manufacturer of highly specialized and sophisticated 
industrial process measurement devices and control 
equipment for, inter alia, the U.S. Navy and NASA. On July 
31, 1996, all its design and production computer programs 
were permanently deleted. About 1,200 computer programs 
were deleted and purged, crippling Omega's manufacturing 
capabilities and resulting in a loss of millions of dollars in 
sales and contracts. 
 
In January 1998, Lloyd was indicted on two counts: (1) 
computer sabotage in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1030(a)(5)(A) 
(criminalizing "knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a 
program, information, code or command, and, as a result of 
such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage, without 
authorization, to a protected computer") and 18 U.S.C. S 2, 
and (2) transportation of stolen goods, namely computer 
hardware and software equipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
SS 2314 and 2. Lloyd was tried by a jury in the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey from April 19, 2000 to 
May 9, 2000. The government's theory of the case was that 
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Lloyd, an Omega employee, planted a computer "time 
bomb" in the central file server of Omega's computer 
network while employed there, and that the "time bomb" 
detonated after he was fired from the company. The 
defense's theory was that the massive deletion of files could 
have resulted from an accident or could have been caused 
by another employee, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. The defense contended that Lloyd could 
not have committed the act of sabotage because he did not 
have direct access to the system after he was fired and 
because he had no motive before he was fired, as his firing 
was without warning. 
 
During the course of the trial, the government presented 
10 witnesses and the defense presented 10 witnesses. The 
testimony showed that from 1985 to July 10, 1996, Lloyd 
worked at Omega as its only computer system 
administrator. In September 1995, Lloyd received Novell 
training, obtained Novell certification, and installed the 
Novell computer network onto Omega's computer system. 
With Novell, Omega was able to place all of its information 
on a central file server, which acted as a central storage 
device and allowed all the information on the server to be 
shared with other computers on the network. Government 
witnesses testified at trial that Lloyd was the only person 
who maintained the Novell computer network and had top- 
level supervisory access to it. One of the government's 
computer experts explained that supervisory access"means 
that . . . [an] account has full access to everything on the 
server." App. at 552. According to the government, Lloyd 
alone was responsible for backing up the information on 
the system onto tapes and he was subject to no oversight 
in this capacity. 
 
The government argued to the jury that beginning in 
1994 or 1995, Lloyd became a difficult employee. Witnesses 
testified that he repeatedly elbowed, shoved, and bumped 
colleagues in the hallways, and that he became verbally 
abusive. Apparently he was counseled on several occasions 
about these problems, but never improved his behavior. In 
May 1995, because of Lloyd's continuing interpersonal 
problems, he was transferred from supervisor of Omega's 
CNC Department (the manufacturing side of Omega's plant, 
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where machines actually created the thousands of products 
that comprised Omega's inventory) to a position as a 
manufacturing engineering support person. Lloyd's 
supervisor, James Ferguson, testified for the government 
that, even though he told Lloyd this change in positions 
was only a "lateral move," in fact it constituted a 
"demotion," as it took supervisory capabilities away from 
Lloyd. App. at 62. Courtney Walsh, a former subordinate 
and close friend of Lloyd who had since become estranged 
from him, replaced Lloyd as supervisor of the CNC 
Department. 
 
Government witnesses testified at trial that they hoped 
this change in positions would cause Lloyd to improve his 
behavior, but it had the opposite effect and his 
interpersonal problems increased. In February 1996, Lloyd 
received a performance review and raise. His performance 
was rated a `7' on a scale of 1 to 10, which meant "often 
exceeds expectations." App. at 66. He also received a 4% 
raise, which was lower than his 7.2% raise in 1993, 4.6% 
raise in 1994, and 4.92% raise in 1995. App. at 67. The 
government argued at trial that the demotion, along with 
the substandard performance review and raise, indicated to 
Lloyd that he would soon be fired, thus providing him with 
the motive to sabotage Omega's computer system. 
 
Government witnesses also testified that Lloyd had 
instituted a policy at Omega in late June 1996 to"clean up" 
all individual computers in Omega's CNC Department. The 
intention was to delete all unnecessary information from 
the individual computers. According to the policy, all 
employees were required to save their files to the file server 
and were prohibited from making their own backups. In 
accordance with this policy, Lloyd moved those portions of 
computer programs that ask end-users questions about 
safety precautions from the individual computers to the file 
server. Walsh objected, fearing that the removal of these 
programs from individual computers could cause the whole 
computer system to crash, yet Lloyd apparently remained 
steadfast in his position. 
 
According to the government, Lloyd's behavior raised 
concerns with a number of Omega's managers, in 
particular Ferguson, who decided in late June 1996 that it 
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was time to fire Lloyd. Concerned that Lloyd had too much 
control over Omega's network and that his termination 
would leave no one at Omega with access to the network, 
Ferguson testified that he asked Lloyd to give access to the 
file server to himself, Al DiFrancesco in Human Resources, 
and another employee, William Wall. Lloyd never did so. 
 
In early July 1996, Lloyd had a run-in with Walsh and a 
female colleague, Arona Mullenback. Lloyd met with 
DiFrancesco and Wall to discuss the matter, after which 
DiFrancesco realized it was time to fire Lloyd. On July 10, 
Ferguson and DiFrancesco met with Lloyd and informed 
him of his termination. They stated it was due to his 
longstanding interpersonal problems and the repeated 
incidents of physical intimidation. The firing was effective 
immediately and Lloyd was quickly escorted from the 
premises. 
 
On July 31, 1996, Ferguson learned that the file server 
on Omega's computer system would not boot up. That same 
day Lloyd told representatives of W.L. Gore in response to 
the job application of Lloyd's friend Raymond Nabb, 
another Omega employee, that "everybody's job at Omega is 
in jeopardy." App. at 601-602. Days later, Ferguson realized 
that all of Omega's CNC programs on the file server, which 
contained instructions for operating the machines, had 
been lost and could not be recovered. Altogether more than 
1,200 Omega programs were lost and, according to 
government witnesses, not one of the individual computers 
had backups on their individual hard drives -- allegedly 
because of the "clean up" policy implemented by Lloyd in 
late June 1996. 
 
In response, Omega tried to hire locally-based 
programmers to recover the lost programs but these efforts 
proved futile. Thomas Inglin, one of the programmers 
trained in Novell networks, testified that the files had been 
deleted and "purged," i.e., rendered unusable and 
unrecoverable. App. at 425. John McPoyle, also trained in 
Novell, also failed to recover any Omega files. 
 
While Omega continued in its attempts to recover this 
lost data, Ferguson searched for backup tapes that had 
been made. He contacted Lloyd and repeatedly asked Lloyd 
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for any tapes that he had but Lloyd answered that he had 
none. Ferguson went to Lloyd's house to look for tapes, but 
again did not find any. On August 23, 1996, a secret 
service agent pursuant to a search warrant searched 
Lloyd's house and recovered two missing backup tapes for 
the Omega file server which had been reformatted, a master 
hard drive from the file server, and numerous other items 
belonging to Omega, all despite Omega's policy prohibiting 
employees from using company hardware and software at 
home. 
 
In August and September 1996, Omega continued to seek 
a solution, hiring a variety of programmers in hopes of 
recovering the lost data. Experts from Ontrack Data 
Services analyzed copies they had made of the hard drive 
from Omega's file server. Although they failed to recover the 
programs, the Ontrack experts concluded that the 
programs had been not only deleted but also "purged." App. 
at 500. Robert Hackett, Ontrack's Remote Data Recovery 
Operations Supervisor, testified at trial that "issu[ing a] 
`delete' . . . would be similar to someone just taking a piece 
of paper and putting it into the trash bin, [but] issuing a 
`purge,' that is going to take what's in the trash bin, . . . 
shred it into very small pieces, . . . and throw[ ] them all up 
in the air." App. at 500. Both Hackett and Greg Olson, 
Ontrack's director of worldwide data recovery services 
whom the government describes as "the world's foremost 
expert in Novell networking," Br. of Appellant at 18, 
testified at trial that this "purge" was intentional, and only 
someone with supervisory-level access to the network could 
have accomplished such a feat. App. at 502, 548. 
Government witnesses testified that normally with Novell 
networks only one person has supervisory-level access and 
that that one person at Omega was Lloyd. 
 
Olson further testified that he had reason to believe July 
30, 1996 was the trigger date that set off the actual 
deletion of files. Olson characterized a string of commands 
entitled "FUSE.EXE" as a "time bomb" because anyone who 
attempted to log on to the server on any date after July 30, 
1996 would detonate the program and cause a massive 
deletion of data. He found that the program that deleted 
files was similar to a Microsoft program called"DELTREE," 
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but only reconfigured for Novell. Olson ruled out the 
possibility of accidental deletion because of the specificity of 
the commands. He also testified that he examined the hard 
drive recovered from Lloyd's home and found the exact 
same strings of commands that comprised "FUSE.EXE." 
App. at 571-572. 
 
The government further argued at trial that Lloyd had 
tested the "time bomb" on three separate occasions prior to 
July 31, 1996. Olson testified that the "time bomb" had 
been tested on February 21, 1996, on April 21, 1996, and 
on May 30, 1996. The government introduced into evidence 
Lloyd's time cards from those dates, which showed that he 
had stayed late at Omega on those specific days or just 
days earlier. App. at 569-571. Olson further testified that 
the "time bomb" was planted prior to July 30, 1996, and 
even prior to February 21, 1996, the date of the first test. 
App. at 585. 
 
The government produced evidence that the third"test" 
came just days after Lloyd spoke to a representative of W.L. 
Gore & Associates at a job fair about a possible job 
opening. Lloyd then interviewed with W.L. Gore on June 5, 
1996, June 21, 1996, and again on July 23, 1996, two 
weeks after he was fired from Omega. An employee in the 
human resources department at W.L. Gore testified that, in 
the interviews, Lloyd acknowledged that he was willing to 
accept a salary of $45,000, less than the $57,000 he was 
receiving from Omega. The W.L. Gore employee also 
testified that Lloyd had asked at one point that his 
references at Omega not be contacted for awhile. Sometime 
between July 23 and July 31, Lloyd was offered a position 
at W.L. Gore paying $49,000 per year, and he accepted. 
Prior to Lloyd's firing, Omega did not know he had been 
interviewing with W.L. Gore. 
 
The government describes Olson's testimony as 
suggesting that "only an individual with system 
administrative skills, programming skills, Microsoft 
Windows experience, and independent knowledge of how to 
change the deleting program's message could have" 
committed the act of computer sabotage. Br. of Appellant at 
22. It further contends that only Lloyd had each of these 
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necessary skills and the necessary access to commit this 
crime. 
 
In response, the defense argued to the jury that the 
government's case was based on a series of assumptions 
that could not be proven. First, the defense tried to refute 
the government's evidence that Lloyd was a belligerent and 
uncooperative employee. Nine former Omega employees 
testified that they never had any problems with Lloyd and 
that Lloyd was always very professional. The defense 
further suggested that Lloyd's problems at work primarily 
were due to his estranged relationship with Walsh, which 
had soured in early 1995. 
 
The defense also contested the government's assertion 
that Lloyd knew he would be fired and thus had a motive 
to commit the act of sabotage. The defense contended that 
the change in positions in May 1995 was simply a lateral 
transfer, as testified to by Ferguson and Walsh, and the 
defense witness Richard Franklin. Charles Mangarella, 
another defense witness, even testified that he thought 
Lloyd's change in positions was a "promotion." App. at 758. 
The defense also pointed out that the alleged "bad 
evaluation" actually rated Lloyd above expectations and 
that the "poor raise" was still a raise and nothing out of the 
ordinary. Moreover, the defense put before the jury 
Ferguson's strong recommendation of Lloyd to W.L. Gore, 
which Ferguson claimed at trial was nothing but lies. 
Ferguson described Lloyd to W.L. Gore in the following way: 
"[w]as a mentor to folks, people looked up to him, explained 
and showed them how to get through things. He was able 
to develop, coach, team into self manage teams [sic], self 
responsibility." App. at 605. Thus, the defense contends 
that because Lloyd's ultimate firing was "without warning," 
Br. of Appellee at 8, he had no motive to commit the 
sabotage. 
 
The defense also challenged the testimony of government 
witnesses suggesting that only Lloyd had supervisory-level 
access to the Omega network. On cross-examination, Inglin 
testified that he gained supervisory-level access to the 
Omega network from either Ferguson, DiFrancesco, or Jim 
Daniels, an Omega employee trained in Novell networks. 
According to Inglin, "[s]omebody must have" had 
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supervisory rights in order to log on. App. at 423. Similarly, 
McPoyle acknowledged on cross-examination that at least 
seven Omega employees had supervisory-level access to the 
network. Olson as well testified on cross-examination that 
he came across two accounts that had supervisory access 
to the Omega network. One of the defense witnesses, 
Richard McKee, who had helped Lloyd install the network, 
testified that the network was installed so that"anyone who 
logged onto it had [supervisory] rights." App. at 679. 
Several defense witnesses also testified that the computer 
network had virtually no security at all. Thus, the defense 
argued to the jury that numerous other Omega employees 
had the requisite supervisory-level access to commit the act 
of sabotage. 
 
The defense also contested the government's evidence 
regarding Lloyd's alleged "clean up" policy. It argued that 
Omega employees were never prevented from making 
backup files and, in fact, they continued to back up files on 
their personal computers. Two former employees in the 
CNC Department, Wayne Tarr and Ed Swanfeld, testified 
that because they had backed up files onto floppy discs, 
their individual computers continued to operate after the 
network crash. Swanfeld testified that nobody ever told him 
that he couldn't save his files onto his individual computer. 
 
The defense further sought to refute the government's 
emphasis on the amount of Omega property recovered from 
Lloyd's home by pointing out that Lloyd often brought work 
home with him while employed at Omega, and that his 
supervisors knew this. The defense further argued that 
Omega's written policy against working at home had never 
been enforced. Lloyd did not testify. 
 
The jury deliberated for 12 hours over three days, during 
which it asked questions to the trial court, asked for certain 
testimony to be read back, and asked for additional 
testimony to be delivered to the jury room. Ultimately, the 
jury convicted Lloyd on the count of computer sabotage but 
acquitted him on the count of transportation of stolen 
goods. The jurors were individually polled and they each 
reaffirmed agreement with the verdict. 
 
Three days after the jury returned its verdict, on May 12, 
2000, Francis Simpson, Juror No. 1, called the District 
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Court to express discomfort with her vote. The government 
immediately pointed the court to Federal Rule of Evidence 
606(b) and recommended it conduct an informal in camera 
inquiry of the juror to determine whether she had been 
subject to extraneous information that prejudiced her. On 
May 16, 2000, the court conducted that hearing and then 
repeated its questioning of the juror in front of counsel. 
 
Simpson told the trial judge that over the weekend in the 
midst of deliberations she saw a television report discussing 
a computer virus called the "Love Bug." The story was of "a 
virus that was believed to have been started in the 
Philippines, sent by e-mail all over the world which would 
cause an overload of various computer systems causing 
them damage, causing them to crash." App. at 906-907. 
The court then questioned as to the subjective effect of this 
information, and she stated that she learned that it was 
possible for the person who set off the "Love Bug" virus to 
affect computers worldwide, and thought that it was 
possible for Lloyd to have triggered the "time bomb" in the 
Omega computer system without having direct physical 
access to the computer server at the time. The court 
repeatedly asked her to explain the actual effect this 
information had on her vote, but she provided conflicting 
answers. In no particular order, she told the court that the 
information about the "Love Bug" had no effect, that she 
wasn't sure what effect it had, that it changed her vote, and 
that her decision to change her vote to guilty was more 
likely due to her willingness to pacify the other jurors. 
Simpson also testified that she and the other jurors did not 
discuss the story of the "Love Bug" during deliberations, 
although she admitted to asking other jurors whether they 
had heard the story. 
 
After the hearing, Lloyd moved for a new trial and the 
District Court granted the motion. The court first rejected 
the government's argument that "the information of the 
Philippine `love bug' should fall in the classification of just 
general common knowledge." App. at 921. The District 
Court stated: 
 
       . . . This case was tried vigorously and it was tried on 
       the theory of somehow and sometime before he was 
       terminated from his employment, this defendant 
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       sabotaged the computer system at his employment 
       place. Some weeks after he had been terminated, he 
       never having been allowed to return to that 
       employment, the system crashed. 
 
        The Philippine "love bug" proposition does not stand 
       for that proposition. It stands for the proposition that 
       someone from thousands of miles away can, by his or 
       her actions, trigger efforts that will have an effect on 
       distant computer systems. That was not the theory 
       that the government advanced in this case and it 
       therefore, seems to me, would follow that the average 
       juror, having heard about the `love bug' and using that 
       information, that's the key, and using that information, 
       would place his or her vote upon an actual pedestal 
       that was not presented to her by the government. 
 
App. at 921-922. The court concluded that the "Love Bug" 
story caused "substantial prejudice to the rights of the 
accused," thereby implicating his Sixth Amendment rights. 
App. at 922. The government filed a timely notice of appeal. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3731. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The government contends on appeal that the District 
Court abused its discretion in granting the defendant's 
motion for a new trial based on Simpson's testimony about 
her subjective reaction to extraneous information and that 
the court's inquiry into her subjective reaction violated Rule 
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
 
We note that Lloyd's brief on appeal fails to address these 
issues, and instead concentrates on the Sixth Amendment's 
protection of the right of confrontation and cross- 
examination, issues we believe are not raised by the 
circumstances here. 
 
We review a district court's grant of a motion for a new 
trial as well as its investigation of extraneous information 
for an abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. Vermont Castings, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 391, 394 (3d Cir. 1999). We also review for 
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abuse of discretion a district court's finding on whether the 
extraneous information prejudiced the defendant. See 
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1392-93 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
As this court recently discussed in Wilson, we do not 
permit jurors to impeach their own verdicts. See  170 F.3d 
at 394. "The purpose of this rule is to promote finality of 
verdicts, encourage free deliberations among jurors, and 
maintain the integrity of the jury as a judicial decision- 
making body." Id. As an opinion from the Sixth Circuit 
recently stated, "[i]f . . . courts were to permit a lone juror 
to attack a verdict through an open-ended narrative 
concerning the thoughts, views, statements, feelings, and 
biases of herself and all other jurors sharing in that verdict, 
the integrity of the American jury system would suffer 
irreparably." United States v. Gonzalez, 227 F.3d 520, 527 
(6th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, "[a] criminal defendant is 
entitled to a determination of his or her guilt by an 
unbiased jury based solely upon evidence properly admitted 
against him or her in court." Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 
F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1987). Rule 606(b) seeks to 
accommodate these competing considerations by providing: 
 
       Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
       indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or 
       statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
       deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or 
       any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the 
       juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
       indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes 
       in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify 
       on the question whether extraneous prejudicial 
       information was improperly brought to the jury's 
       attention or whether any outside influence was 
       improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a 
       juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the 
       juror concerning a matter about which the juror would 
       be precluded from testifying be received for these 
       purposes. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). 
 
Thus, a court may inquire into the verdict if " `extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
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attention or [if] any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror.' " Wilson , 170 F.3d at 394 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)). However, "the court may only 
inquire into the existence of extraneous information," and 
not "into the subjective effect of such information on the 
particular jurors." Id. 
 
It is apparent from the transcript of the District Court's 
interview with Simpson that the court's questioning went 
beyond the scope permitted by Rule 606(b). The court 
repeatedly asked the juror to describe the actual effect the 
information had on her vote. See Sealed App. at 946-949, 
951-952. Such questioning clearly is impermissible under 
Rule 606(b), and when the District Court issued its order 
granting Lloyd's motion for a new trial it acknowledged that 
it "probably should not have asked [the juror] that question 
specifically." App. at 907. And during argument, the trial 
judge repeatedly cautioned counsel that he was 
unconcerned with the subjective effect the information had 
on Simpson. See App. at 916, 918, 921. Inasmuch as a 
portion of the District Court's questions and the juror's 
responses were not admissible under Rule 606(b), we limit 
our inquiry to the portion of the colloquy that was 
admissible, i.e., the juror's declarations detailing the nature 
and existence of the extraneous information. See United 
States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating 
that "[i]n determining whether [the juror's] misconduct 
warrants a new trial, our inquiry is limited to the 
admissible portions of the declarations"). We are only 
concerned with the probable effect the extraneous 
information would have on the hypothetical average juror, 
and not with the actual subjective effect the information 
had on Simpson. 
 
A new trial is warranted if the defendant likely suffered 
"substantial prejudice" as a result of the jury's exposure to 
the extraneous information. United States v. Gilsenan, 949 
F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1991). In examining for prejudice, we 
must conduct "an objective analysis by considering the 
probable effect of the allegedly prejudicial information on a 
hypothetical average juror." Id. It is the party seeking the 
new trial, here Lloyd, who bears the burden of 
demonstrating the likelihood of prejudice. See Waldorf v. 
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Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1993). We independently 
review the record to determine if that party has met that 
burden. See Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95. 
 
Several courts of appeals have applied a presumption of 
prejudice whenever a jury is exposed to extraneous 
information. See, e.g., Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of 
Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 922 (10th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1064 (2d Cir. 
1983); United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 603 (8th Cir. 
1982). The genesis of this presumption is the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 
(1954), where the Court explained that "[i]n a criminal case, 
any private communication, contact, or tampering directly 
or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about a matter 
pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed 
presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of 
known rules of the court . . . with full knowledge of the 
parties." Id. at 229. 
 
This court has applied the presumption of prejudice only 
when the extraneous information is of a considerably 
serious nature. See Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 710 n.6; see also 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1394 (commenting that only"certain 
extra-jury influences create" the presumption). In 
particular, we have tended to apply the presumption of 
prejudice when a juror is directly contacted by third- 
parties. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 666 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (stating that application of the presumption is 
most appropriate when there is direct communication 
between a juror and a third-party during deliberations); see 
also United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 261 (1st Cir. 
1990) (applying "the Remmer standard . . . to cases of 
significant ex parte contacts with sitting jurors or those 
involving aggravated circumstances"). 
 
In contrast, we tend not to apply the presumption to 
circumstances in which the extraneous information at issue 
is a media report, such as a television story or newspaper 
article. See Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95-96 (not applying 
presumption of prejudice to media coverage of failed plea 
agreement in the case); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 
1170, 1172 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (not applying 
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presumption to media coverage of defendant's indictment 
on other charges and its description of him as a"reputed 
underworld figure"); see also Console, 13 F.3d at 666 n.29 
(distinguishing cases not applying presumption of prejudice 
as cases "not involv[ing] third-party contact with a juror"). 
Yet, as this court stated in Waldorf, "[i]n some cases the 
publicity that occurs is so fundamentally prejudicial that 
actual prejudice is presumed as a matter of law. Where the 
improper publicity is of a less serious nature however, no 
similar presumption applies." 3 F.3d at 710 n.6 (quotation 
omitted). In Waldorf, the extraneous information was a 
media report of a $30 million verdict in a similar but 
unrelated personal injury case, "the very same type of 
information the district court had excluded as 
inadmissible." Id. at 707. Still, we declined to apply the 
presumption in that case. See id. at 710-11. 
 
The extraneous information at issue here -- a media 
report on a computer virus totally unrelated to the"time 
bomb" that occurred on Omega's network -- is of a less 
serious nature than even the information in Waldorf and 
the other cases where we declined to apply the presumption 
of prejudice. Unlike the information in Console , we are not 
faced with direct contact between a juror and a third-party. 
And, unlike the extraneous information in Waldorf, the 
"Love Bug" story is both completely unrelated and factually 
dissimilar to the facts of the case. Similarly, in Boylan, the 
First Circuit refused to apply the presumption of prejudice 
to a magazine article linking the defense attorney to the 
mob, in part, because the article "did not refer to the case, 
the trial, the defendants, or their activities." 898 F.2d at 
261. Likewise, we shall not apply the presumption of 
prejudice to this case. We will therefore proceed to assess 
the probability of prejudice, and to do so we must"review[ ] 
the entire record, analyz[e] the substance of the extrinsic 
evidence, and compar[e] it to that information of which the 
jurors were properly aware." United States v. Weiss, 752 
F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 
In examining for prejudice, this court has never set forth 
a list of factors to consider, yet it is apparent from our 
jurisprudence that several factors do stand out as relevant 
to the analysis. To start, it is obvious that, for there to be 
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any possibility of prejudice, the extraneous information 
must relate to one of the elements of the case that was 
decided against the party moving for a new trial. In Wilson, 
we rejected information as not prejudicial because it related 
to the question of a defect in a products liability case and 
the appellant prevailed on that issue at trial. See 170 F.3d 
at 394. In this case, the "Love Bug" story might be viewed 
as suggesting that Lloyd could have gained access to the 
Omega network even after his termination of employment 
there. Because access to the network was a necessary 
component of the crime of computer sabotage, implicit 
within the jury's guilty verdict was a determination that 
Lloyd had that access. Therefore, our analysis must 
proceed further. 
 
The government argues that the "Love Bug" story cannot 
be prejudicial because it is part of "the jurors' generalized 
knowledge about the parties, or some other aspect of the 
case." Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 
1975). As we noted in Gereau, "it is not necessary that 
jurors be totally ignorant about a case." Id.  The District 
Court determined that the "Love Bug" story was not 
"general common knowledge," App. at 921, even though 
several members of the jury had computer knowledge. As 
this is a finding of fact that merits considerable deference, 
see Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 
F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and 
the fact that several jurors in this case "had never even 
used a computer," App. at 909, we are not willing to 
overturn the court's finding. 
 
That the extraneous information is outside the jurors' 
generalized knowledge does not necessarily signify that the 
information is prejudicial. One factor often considered by 
courts is the extent of the jury's exposure to the extraneous 
information. See Console, 13 F.3d at 667 (approving the 
district court's inquiry as to the identities of jurors exposed 
to the extraneous information); Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 711 
(noticing that half of the jurors had been exposed to the 
allegedly prejudicial information). In this case, that means 
we must inquire into what extent the "Love Bug" story was 
shared with the rest of the jury. Simpson testified that on 
the last day of deliberations -- the first day following media 
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reports of the "Love Bug" virus -- the jury did not discuss 
the "Love Bug" at all during the actual deliberations. 
Nevertheless, she admitted to asking "some jurors" if they 
had heard the story over the weekend, and they said they 
did, but the jurors "didn't discuss it, we mentioned it." 
Sealed App. at 953. 
 
Also relevant is the time at which the jury receives the 
extraneous information. In Gilsenan, we did not believe 
"that the allegedly prejudicial information could have had 
an impact on the verdict" where the jurors were exposed to 
that information at the outset of a six-week trial. 949 F.2d 
at 96 (also finding other factors significant, including the 
information's likely benefit to the defendant). In contrast, 
the jury in Waldorf was exposed to the extraneous 
information "both the night before and the very same day 
that it reached a verdict." 3 F.3d at 713. The court noted 
that "a more critical moment would have been difficult to 
find." Id.; cf. Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 926 (stating that 
prejudice may be inferred where jury reaches verdict less 
than three hours after being exposed to extraneous 
information "despite having been plagued by `irreconcilable 
differences' the night before"). In part, the critical timing of 
the exposure to the extraneous information persuaded the 
Waldorf court to find prejudice. See 3 F.3d at 713 (also 
finding relevant the fact that the "information was precisely 
the type specifically excluded by the district court during 
trial"). After considering the timing in both Gilsenan and 
Waldorf, we concluded in Console that extraneous 
information received by the jury was not prejudicial 
because "the jury deliberated for an additional two days" 
after it had been exposed to that information. 13 F.3d at 
668-69 (quotation omitted). 
 
Here, Simpson was exposed to the "Love Bug" story over 
the course of the weekend that preceded the jury's final day 
of deliberations. Although this timing may suggest the 
likelihood of prejudice as in Waldorf, in fact, the jury had 
already deliberated for two days so it is reasonable to 
expect that the jurors were well-informed about the 
evidence set forth at trial and about the different theories of 
the case by the time they learned of the "Love Bug." Thus, 
it is unlikely that the average hypothetical juror would have 
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been influenced by such unrelated information. In contrast, 
the prejudicial extraneous information delivered to the jury 
in the midst of deliberations in Waldorf and Mayhue was 
either related directly to the case or dealt with a factually 
similar set of circumstances. 
 
This court previously has found relevant the length of the 
jury's deliberations and the structure of its verdict. In 
Gilsenan, we noted that "the jury deliberated for a week and 
delivered a fractured1 verdict showing that it carefully 
delineated among the offenses and between the appellants." 
949 F.2d at 96. We concluded that such deliberate care 
suggested that the extraneous information did not prejudice 
the jury. See id.; see also Console, 13 F.3d at 669 (finding 
noteworthy the fact that the jury returned two partial 
verdicts before convicting the defendant on the count 
seeking reversal). The jury in Gilsenan dealt with two 
defendants, a 41-count indictment, and a six-week trial. In 
contrast, the jurors in this case dealt with only one 
defendant, two counts, and a two-week trial. Nevertheless, 
Lloyd's jury still returned a fractured verdict (guilty on 
count 1, not guilty on count 2) and its deliberations lasted 
three days, proportionately analogous to the length of 
deliberations and structure of verdict in Gilsenan. 
Moreover, during deliberations Lloyd's jury asked the court 
a number of questions and even requested that certain trial 
testimony be delivered to the jury room. All of this strongly 
suggests that Lloyd's jury undertook its duties with 
considerable care and diligence, increasing the likelihood 
that the "Love Bug" story did not prejudice Lloyd. 
 
We also find informative the District Court's instruction 
to the jury at the close of trial that it should only consider 
the evidence developed in the case. App. at 794-796 
(pointing the jury to the testimony at trial as well as 
documents and other physical items submitted into 
evidence). We presume that juries follow such instructions. 
See Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 96 (finding noteworthy that the 
jury was exposed to the extraneous information "after the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We were advised at argument that "fractured" in this context means 
that the jury was able to distinguish between the two counts, convicting 
on one and acquitting on the other. 
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jury was instructed to decide the case on the basis only of 
the evidence and not extrinsic information, an instruction 
the jury is presumed to have followed"). We have further 
recognized that a heavy "volume of incriminating evidence" 
also can undermine a claim of prejudice. United States v. 
Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United 
States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that the presumption of prejudice was 
overcome by overwhelming evidence of the defendant's 
guilt). 
 
The government's principal argument on appeal is that 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt at trial made the"Love 
Bug" story insignificant and irrelevant. The government's 
theory at trial was that Lloyd was an uncooperative, 
obstructionist, and belligerent employee who sabotaged 
Omega's computer network by "planting" a "time bomb" 
prior to his firing on July 10, 1996, set to detonate on July 
31, 1996. The government contended that Lloyd knew he 
was going to get fired because he had been demoted, had 
been written-up, and had received a lower-than-expected 
performance review and raise, and that his motive was 
revenge. The government cites Lloyd's job interviews with 
W.L. Gore & Associates as evidence of his expectation of an 
upcoming departure from Omega. The government further 
argued to the jury that whoever committed the act of 
sabotage needed direct supervisory-level access to the 
Omega network as well as advanced computer 
programming skills, and that only Lloyd had both the 
requisite access and skills. Government witnesses testified 
to Lloyd's workplace behavior and even an expert testified 
that the same program that allegedly caused the"purge" of 
all the network files was also present on the hard drive of 
a computer found at Lloyd's home. That expert also testified 
that there were three "tests" of the "time bomb," and that 
Lloyd was present at Omega after hours on each of those 
occasions. At trial, the government specifically argued that 
Lloyd committed the act of sabotage by direct access before 
getting fired, not by remote access after getting fired. 
 
It is apparent from the record that the government put 
forth credible evidence incriminating Lloyd in the computer 
sabotage under the theory that he knew his days at Omega 
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were numbered, and that he "planted" the "time bomb" 
prior to his termination at a time when he had direct access 
to the Omega network. Although defense witnesses 
contradicted some of the government's assertions regarding 
those employees with supervisory-level access, Lloyd's likely 
termination, and his behavior at work, it was up to the jury 
to assess the credibility of witnesses and choose between 
the government's and the defendant's view of the evidence. 
Further, there was strong uncontradicted evidence to 
support the verdict. Significantly, evidence that went 
unchallenged included: the string of commands found on 
the hard drive in Lloyd's home that was identical to that 
used in the program that purged the Omega network of all 
its files; the testimony that the "time bomb" had been 
tested three times previously and that on each occasion 
Lloyd had stayed late at the office; Lloyd's willingness to 
accept up to $12,000 less in a job with W.L. Gore than in 
his position at Omega; and Lloyd's comment to a W.L. Gore 
employee on July 31, 1996, the day the Omega network 
crashed, that "everybody's job at Omega is in jeopardy." 
App. at 601-602. 
 
Most significant is the fact that the story of the"Love 
Bug" virus, as explained earlier, is entirely unrelated to the 
facts and the theories of this case. The "Love Bug" story 
suggests that a person with remote access to a computer 
(i.e., access from afar) could sabotage that computer. 
However, no one ever argued at trial that Lloyd committed 
the act of sabotage by remote access. Instead, the 
government emphasized that Lloyd only could have 
committed the crime before he was fired when he had direct 
access. In discussing the "Love Bug" story in the District 
Court, the prosecutor accurately pointed out that"we are 
talking about a virus, we are not talking about a time 
bomb. We are not talking about deletion of material. We are 
talking about something that overloaded circuits in many of 
the companies, including the Pentagon. It didn't delete 
information." Sealed App. at 956. 
 
Notably, there was only one question that was ever asked 
at trial that had anything to do with the theory of remote 
access. On cross-examination, the defense questioned 
Ontrack expert Robert Hackett, "Were you ever asked, at 
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the outset of your data recovery attempt, to investigate 
whether this was done via modem?" Hackett answered, 
"No," and the questioner continued on to other subjects. 
App. at 524. Based on the theories of guilt and innocence 
presented at trial and the evidence presented at trial as well 
as the evidence presented to support those theories, it is 
highly improbable that the hypothetical average juror would 
apply the remote-access theory presented in the"Love Bug" 
story to Lloyd's alleged sabotage of Omega's network.2 The 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded in a similar 
case that "[b]ecause the [extraneous information] was not 
logically connected to material issues in the case .. . to find 
a material connection between the extraneous information 
and the jury's verdict would require an assumption that the 
jury members reached an irrational conclusion. We will not 
essay so long a logical leap." Boylan, 898 F.2d at 261 
(quotation and citations omitted). We likewise will not make 
that leap. 
 
We may overturn the verdict and grant a new trial only 
if there was a substantial likelihood of prejudice. See 
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 711. We agree with the government that 
"[b]ecause the `Love Bug' virus was not related in the least 
to the facts or theories of the present case, that information 
would not have had an impact on the hypothetical average 
juror's vote in Lloyd's case." Br. of Appellant at 47. Thus, 
Lloyd has not met his burden of proof. 
 
Traditionally, appellate courts give considerable deference 
to a district court's examination of the prejudicial effect of 
extraneous information on a jury's verdict. See Bertoli, 40 
F.3d at 1393; Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 922. However, in the 
instant case, after the District Court deviated from Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b) by questioning Simpson about the 
actual effect the "Love Bug" story had on her vote, App. at 
907, the court projected her subjective reaction, which was, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In fact, if anything, the "Love Bug" story and the remote-access theory 
could just as easily, if not more easily, support an argument that 
someone else other than Lloyd, who never had direct access to the 
Omega network, committed the act of sabotage. See Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 
at 95 (noting that the extraneous information could actually support the 
defense position, so it cannot possibly be prejudicial to the defense). 
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at best, ambiguous, onto the hypothetical average juror. 
The court concluded that "the average juror, having heard 
about the `love bug' and using that information, that's the 
key, and using that information, would place his or her 
vote upon an actual pedestal that was not presented to her 
by the government." App. at 922. However, in light of the 
significant dissimilarities between the "Love Bug" and the 
"time bomb," the court's conclusion that the average juror 
would "use" the information at all cannot be sustained. 
Accordingly, having found no evidence to suggest that Lloyd 
was prejudiced substantially by a juror's exposure to the 
story of the "Love Bug" virus, we conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We will reverse the grant of a new trial, reinstate the 
conviction on count one of the indictment for computer 
sabotage, and direct the court to proceed to sentencing. 
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